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fessor John P. Dalzell, Assistant to the Solicitor, Department of the
Interior, Washington, D. C. Professor Frank W. Hanft, Major, Army
Specialists Corps, now in training for military government, Charlottes-
ville, Va. Professor M. T. Van Hecke, Regional Director, National
War Labor Board, Atlanta, Ga.
During the Summer Session of 1943 at the Law School of the Uni-
versity of North Carolina Judge J. Warren Madden, of the United
States Court of Claims, gave the course in Labor Law. Dean Robert
H. Wettach has been serving as Public Panel Member for the Regional
War Labor Board.
The executives of the Editorial Staff of the NORTH CAROLINA LAW
REVIEW for 1943-44 are: William A. Johnson, Editor-in-Chief, John F.
Shuford and Cecil J. Hill, Associate Editors. They are likewise the
recipients of the faculty research assistantships for the current year.
John T. Kilpatrick, Jr. and Fred R. Edney, Jr. were elected last
spring to the honorary Law School society of the Order of the Coif.
Of last year's editorial staff the following are in military service:
C. D. Hogue, Jr., Arthur C. Jones, Jr., Wallace C. Murchison and H.
Milton Short, Jr.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Domestic Relations-Work and Labor-Contracts Between Persons
Living in a Family Relationship
Plaintiff, daughter-in-law of the defendant's intestate, and her hus-
band moved into the home of her father-in-law in June, 1929. In
March, 1936, the father-in-law suffered a stroke of paralysis, causing
a gradual deterioriation in his health until his death in 1941. During
the period of illness the plaintiff acted as housekeeper-nurse for her
father-in-law, doing such menial tasks as washing his bed clothes two
or three times weekly, bathing him, giving him medicine, and preparing
a special diet. There was no express contract to pay for these services
between the parties, but the father-in-law said in plaintiff's presence that
he expected her to be paid out of his estate after his death., Plaintiff
brought an action against the administrators of her father-in-law's
estate to recover for the value of her services rendered during the ill-
ness on the basis of an implied contract to pay. The defendants argued
that such services were rendered by a person living in a family re-
lationship and, therefore, were gratuitous. The court held there was
sufficient evidence of an implied contract to allow plaintiff to recover.2
'Francis v. Francis, 223 N. C. 401, 26 S. E. (2d) 907 (1943), Record on Ap-
peal, 20-29.
, Francis v. Frands, 223 N. C. 401, 26 S. E. (2d) 907 (1943).
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Generally, where one voluntarily accepts the benefits of services
performed in his behalf, he ratifies the act of the party performing them
and bec6mes liable to him for the reasonable value thereof.3 The rule
does not usually apply to services rendered between persons living in
a family relationship, regardless of the kinship between the parties. The
law presumes that services are performed freely because of the desire
to promote family interest and goodwill when performed between hus-
band and wife,4 parent-in-law and child-in-law,5 uncle and nephew,0
brother and brother,7 parent and child,s stepfather and stepchild,O* or
even strangers living in the family relationship. 10 It is essential in the
above relationships that the parties live together as a family."l*
It must be noted, however, that kinship alone does not create a pre-
sumption of gratuitous service.12  Where the parties do not live to-
gether in the family relationship, the presumption of the gratuitous
nature ceases to exist, or is greatly weakened, according to the prox-
imity of relationship and the nature of the services performed.13
The presumption of gratuity may be overcome by proof either of
an express agreement to pay, or of such facts and circumstances as
satisfactorily show that both parties at the time expected payment to
be made, thus giving rise to an implied contract.1 4* Where the family
relationship exists, the claimant has the burden of refuting the pre-
sumption and proving the existence of an express or implied under-
8 Shippen v. Walker, 26 Ga. App. 280, 105 S. E. 853 (1921); Winkler v.
Killian, 141 N. C. 575, 54 S. E. 540 (1906) ; 28 R. C. L. 668, §3.
'Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17, 45 Am. Rep. 160 (1883).
'See Brown v. McCurdy, 278 Pa. 19, 22, 122 Atl. 169, 170 (1923).
'Bolling v. Bolling's Adm'r, 146 Ky. 313, 142 S. W. 387 (1912).
"Hodge v. Hodge, 47 Wash. 196, 91 Pac. 764 (1907).
'See Thysell v. McDonald, 134 Minn. 400, 402, 159 N. W. 958, 959 (1916);
Williams v. Halford, 73 S. C. 119, 53 S. E. 88 (1905) (illegitimate children).
*See Sargent v. Foland 104 Ore. 296, 308, 207 Pac. 349, 352 (1922) (The
mere relationship of stepfather and stepchild does not raise the presumption of
gratuity, for the parent does not have to receive the child.).
20 Gjurich v. Feig, 164 Cal. 429, 129 Pac. 464, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 111 (1913).
*The federal rule accords with that of the states: The Morning Star, 1 F.
(2d) 410 (W. D. Wash., 1924).
An interesting point arises in the case of bigamous marriages. In Cooper v.
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721 (1888) the court held
that one could not recover against an administrator for services rendered during
a bigamous marriage. North Carolina has taken a contrary view on another
ground. In Sanders v. Ragan, 172 N. C. 612, 90 S. E. 777 (1916) the court held
that a woman, innocently believing that she was becoming a lawful wife, was en-
titled to recover, by reason of a fraud practiced upon her, the value of her services
above the benefits she may have received in clothes and maintenance.
1 Kerr v. Wilson, 284 Pa. 541, 131 Atl. 468 (1925) ; Gibb's Estate, 266 Pa. 485,
110 Atl. 236 (1920).
"3Hartley v. Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 P. (2d) 616 (1932).
14* Einolf v. Thompson, 95 Minn. 230, 103 N. W. 1026 (1905). For a complete
discussion of family contracts see Havighurst, Services in the Home-A Study
of Contract Concepts in Domestic Relations (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 386.
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standing between the parties that a charge for the services was to be
made and to be met by payment.'6
Many elements are considered by the courts in determining the
validity of a contract between persons living in a family relationship.l 6*
While there are varying theories as to presumptions and counterpre-
sumptions, and what evidence rebuts presumptions, and as to the im-
plications to -be drawn from the evidence, the difference is so minute
as to be of no practical value. The difference of opinion is based upon
the court's views as to whether there should be a higher degree of cer-
tainty and definiteness in the evidence in contracts arising in the family
relationship than those arising in the ordinary civil case.17
In proving the validity of a contract the evidence must show some-
thing more than a mere expression of gratitude. In Dowell v. Dowel's
Adsn'r18 two sons, living on their father's farm and reaping the profits
therefrom, endeavored to recover for services rendered the father at
his request prior to his death. The father expressed his appreciation for
the services and promised to pay for them by leaving them his farm at
his death. But his statement at no time amounted to an express prom-
ise on his part to pay for the services, and were not sufficient to consti-
tute an unqualified acknowledgment of an indebtedness on his part for
such services. The court by implication held that such expressions
were merely gratitude, and the free use of the farm afforded ample
compensation.
A mere expectation to pay by the person receiving the benefits does
not create a contract. In Avitt v. Smith19 a mother remarked in the
plaintiff's presence that "she wanted the plaintiff to have sixty acres
of her land in consideration of his taking care of her." The court held
that the old lady's remark showed a "kind disposition," but failed to
show any evidence of a contract or promise to pay. This case is dis-
tinguishable from the Francis case in that there was a reciprocity of
services here. The plaintiff testified that the entire family worked to-
gether: "I (plaintiff) supported them and they supported me."
Justice McIver in Ex parte Aycock 2o seems to have summed up
the requirements in saying: "It must have been the purpose ... to as-
sume a legal obligation, capable of being enforced."
In the case of infants there can be no contract between a parent
and a minor child on a master-servant basis unless the child is shown
"5Hartley v. Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 P. (2d) 616 (1932) ; Miller v. Richard-
son 56 S. W. (2d) 614 (St. Louis Ct. of App., Mo., 1933) ; 28 R. C L. 677, §13.0* See (1908) 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 873 for extended annotation on this point.T Ibid. See Bryant v. Fogg, 125 Me. 420, 424, 134 AtI. 510, 512 (1926).
"8137 Ky. 167, 125 S. W. 283 (1910).
19 120 N. C. 392, 27 S. E. 91 (1897).
20 34 S. C. 255, 13 S. E. 450 (1890).
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to have been emancipated, and the burden of proof of emancipation
rests upon the one alleging such.2 '
Although it has been held that in the absence of an express contract
the services are presumed to be gratuitous, 22 the majority of the de-
cisions hold that a contract may be inferred from sufficient facts and
circumstances in the evidence reasonably justifying the inference of an
agreement to pay2s* In Miller v. Richardson 4 the plaintiff cared for
her father after the death of her mother, -doing such menial tasks as
cooking for him, caring for the livestock, and acting as his nurse during
his illness. He gave certain proceeds of his farm to her sporadically.
On various occasions he said in the plaintiff's presence that she was to
be paid well, and the plaintiff had replied: "I expect to be repaid."
The court held that there were sufficient facts and circumstances to
justify the inference of a mutual understanding between the -parties
for an implied contract.
Most courts follow the rule that there must be a reciprocity of bene-
fits or a contract will be implied.25* In cases where the recipient of
services rendered is mentally incapable of making a contract, one is
implied for compensation for services of an unusual and extraordinary
nature.2 6* It is not essential under an implied contract that the amount
of the compensation be agreed upon.27
Many cases arise out of services rendered with the expectation of
2 American Products Co. v. Villwock, 7 Wash. (2d) 246, 109 P. (2d) 570
(1941).
22 Baldwin v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 218 S. W. 955 (Kan. City Ct. of App.,
Mo., 1920).
23* McGarvey v. Roods, 73 Iowa 363, 35 N. W. 488 (1887) (Intestate frequently
said that plaintiff should be compensated, that all her property was devoted to
this purpose, and that she had given her other children all that she had intended
to give them. The court held this to be sufficient facts as evidence of an implied
contract.); In re Grogan's Estate, 82 Misc. 555, 145 N. Y. Supp. 285 (1913)
(Daughter, at the request of her father cared for him while he gradually became
helpless at the great sacrifice of her own interests and pleasures without compen-
sation therefor.) ; Winkler v. Killian, 141 N. C. 575, 54 S. E. 540 (1906) (Where
a married daughter, living nearby, cared for her mother during old age.) ; Kerr
v. Wilson, 284 Pa. 541, 131 Atl. 468 (1925) (An aged uncle sought a home with
his nephew to care for him in his old age. No services were rendered by him, nor
were any contemplated.).
24 56 S. W. (2d) 614 (St. Louis Ct. of App., Mo., 1933).
23* Marks Adm'r v. Boardman, 89 S. W. 481 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1905) (A sis-
ter cared for her brother at her home, nursing him and performing for him certain
menial services, being only a detriment to her.); accord, Morton v. Ranier, 82
Ill. 215, 25 Am. Rep. 311 (1876) (Nephew lived with uncle, and after majority
furnished his own clothes and paid his own bills.) ; see In re Grogan's Estate, 82
Misc. 555, 145 N. Y. Supp. 285 (1913).
26* Gover's Adm'r v. Waddle, 245 Ky. 652, 54 S. W. (2d) 19 (1932) ; Key v.
Harris, 116 Tenn. 161, 92 S. W. 235 (1905). (The Key Case by way of dicta
suggests that an allowance for services might be sustained on the ground that the
same were necessaries, citing Waldron v. Davis, 70 N. J. L. 788, 58 AtI. 293
(1904). This theory is weakened in the Key Case, since the parties in Waldron
v. Davis were not living in a family relationship.) "
"' See McGarvey v. Roods, 73 Iowa 363, 35 N. W. 488 (1887).
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being paid by provision in a will. If such a provision is made and the
will is later destroyed, there is sufficient evidence of an agreement to
pay and to be paid; and the claimant does not have to wait until death
to bring an action for recovery.28 Where the testator has made it im-
possible to fulfill the contract by conveying substantial portions of the
property to other parties, the one rendering the services can still re-
cover for the reasonable value thereof under the common counts.
2 9
In the Francis0 case it would have been manifestly unjust to pre-
vent recovery by the presumption of gratuity. The absence of a reci-
procity of benefits is evidence that the plaintiff did not intend gratuity,
and the statement by deceased that he expected plaintiff to be paid out
of his estate adquately shows an implied contract.
CEcIL J. HILL.
Garnishment-Bank Directors--Bank Stock
Action by M, judgment creditor, to garnish $1,000 worth of bank
stock deposited with defendant bank by its owner, a director of the
bank, as required by a state statute1 From a holding that the bank
stock was exempt from garnishment, and an order discharging the
bank as garnishee, M appeals. Held, one judge dissenting, reversed.
The bank stock is subject to garnishment.2
This case squarely presents the question of whether or not bank
stock owned by a judgment debtor, and held by the bank, to qualify
him as a director in the bank can be garnished. It appears that the
rule was well settled at common law that stock in a corporation was not
subject to attachment or garnishment. This rule was based on the
theory that choses in action could not be attached and in those states
allowing attachment or garnishment of choses in action corporate stock
could not be garnisheed unless the statute provided for it,3 and the
courts made no distinction between bank stock and any other corporate
stock in applying this rule. However, it, like so many other common
law rules, has been displaced by statute, in most states, which ex-
pressly or impliedly provide, or have been construed by the courts to
provide that shares of stock in a corporation may be attached or gar-
8 "Einolf v. Thompson, 95 Minn. 230, 103 N. W. 1026 (1905)." Patterson v. Franklin, 168 N. C. 75, 84 S. E. 18 (1915) ; accord, Messier v.
Messier, 34 R. I. 233, 82 Ati. 996 (1912).
" Francis v. Francis, 223 N. C. 401, 26 S. E. (2d) 907 (1943).
ILL STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 1632, §4.
'Molner v. South Chicago Savings Bank, 138 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 7th,
1943).
84 Am. JuR. (1936), Attachment & Garnishment, §351; 10 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONs (perm. ed. 1931) §4759; cf. Elgart v. Mintz, 123 N. J. E. 404, 197
Atl. 747 (Ch. 1938) ; Lambert v. Huff, A. & T. Co., 82 W. Va. 362, 95 S. E. 1031
(1918).
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